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Nomenclature 
ADS-B:  Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AMM:  Airport Management Module 
APDLC:  Airport-Pilot Data Link Communications 
ATC:  Air Traffic Control 
ATIS:  Automatic Terminal Information Service  
AWOS:  Automated Weather Observing System 
CD&A:  Conflict Detection and Alerting 
CD&R:  Conflict Detection and Resolution 
CTAF:  Common Traffic Advisory Frequency  
D-ATIS:  Digital ATIS 
FAF:  Final Approach Fix 
GPS:  Global Positioning System 
HVO:  Higher Volume Operations 
IAF:  Initial Approach Fix 
IF:  Intermediate Fix 
IFR:  Instrument Flight Rules 
IMC:  Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
MAHF:  Missed Approach Holding Fix 
MFD:  Multi-Function Display 
NAS:  National Airspace System 
NNO:  No New Operations 
PA:  Pilot-Advisor 
PFD:  Primary Flight Display 
RNAV:  Area Navigation 
SATS:  Small Aircraft Transportation System 
SCA:  Self-Controlled Area 
TTA:  Time To Approach 
VFR:  Visual Flight Rules 
  
Abstract 
This document expands the Small Aircraft Transportation System 
(SATS) Higher Volume Operations (HVO) concept to include off-nominal 
conditions. The general philosophy underlying the HVO concept is the 
establishment of a newly defined area of flight operations called a Self-
Controlled Area (SCA). During periods of poor weather, a block of 
airspace would be established around designated airports where 
procedural separation is currently employed, i.e. airports with no tower 
and limited or no radar services available. Aircraft flying enroute to a 
SATS airport would be on a standard instrument flight rules flight 
clearance with Air Traffic Control providing separation services. Within 
the SCA, pilots would take responsibility for separation assurance 
between their aircraft and other similarly equipped aircraft. Previous 
work developed the procedures for normal HVO operations. This 
document provides details for a number of off-nominal and emergency 
procedures for situations that could be expected to occur in a future 
SCA. 
1.0 Introduction 
The intent of this document is to expand the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) Higher 
Volume Operations (HVO) operational concept (refs. 1-4) to include a set of off-nominal operations, e.g., 
the failure of an airborne system normally required for a HVO operation. In this regard, this document 
will describe HVO procedures to address off-nominal operations, procedural deviations, equipment 
failures, and aircraft emergencies with a focus on safety and simplicity in the development of these 
procedures. In addition, because equipment design and equipment failure are highly interrelated with the 
development of off-nominal procedures, a specific equipment design will be discussed in this document. 
A major underlying assumption in the development of this document was that only reasonable failures 
and operational errors (i.e., failures and errors that had a practical expectation for occurrence) would be 
addressed. Hence, while the list of off-nominal conditions in this paper is not complete, it does cover a 
wide range of cases. The major design goals for these procedures were to minimize procedure and 
equipment changes relative to the normal procedures that were defined in ref. 1 while minimizing the 
level of system criticality (ref. 5). 
2.0 Background 
2.1 Normal HVO Operations 
The general philosophy underlying the SATS HVO operational concept is the establishment of a 
newly defined area of flight operations called a Self-Controlled Area (SCA). During periods of poor 
weather, a block of airspace would be established around designated airports where procedural separation 
is currently employed by Air Traffic Control (ATC), i.e. airports with no tower and limited or no radar 
services available. Aircraft flying enroute to a SATS airport would be on a standard instrument flight 
rules (IFR) clearance with ATC providing separation services. Within the SCA, pilots would take 
responsibility for separation assurance between their aircraft and other similarly equipped aircraft. Note, 
however, that while pilots would be required to take responsibility for self-separation within the SCA, 
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they would not be required or allowed to take responsibility for establishing the sequence of their arrivals 
within the SCA. This concept would take advantage of a proposed ground-based automation system, 
called an Airport Management Module (AMM), which would provide sequencing information to pilots 
for safe and improved operations. The AMM would typically be located at the airport and would make 
these assignments based on calculations involving aircraft performance, aircraft position information, 
winds in the terminal area, missed approach requirements, and a set of predetermined operating rules for 
the SCA. This sequence assignment process supports actions and decisions made by ATC in that it 
sequences only those aircraft at the lowest altitude approaching the Initial Approach Fixes (IAFs), 
allowing ATC to control the sequence order of the arriving aircraft. This process allows the controller the 
flexibility to resolve issues unknown to the AMM (e.g., crossing airways, weather, and aircraft holding). 
A plan view graphic depicting a generic SCA is shown in figure 1. The SCA would be similar in 
concept to a Class E surface area and is similar to the proposal by Conway and Consiglio in reference 2. 
The waypoints could be existing waypoints for a generic Global Positioning System (GPS) T approach. 
In this concept, the outboard IAFs on the T (e.g., ANNIE and CATHY) would be used for all arrivals. 
These fixes would also be used as the missed approach holding fixes (MAHF). During low traffic 
conditions, an arriving aircraft could fly directly to an IAF at the lowest appropriate IFR altitude and 
upon reaching the IAF, begin an approach operation. During periods of higher traffic conditions, the 
holding pattern in the SCA would be used to delay aircraft while they are waiting for appropriate aircraft-
to-aircraft separation prior to initiating the approach and landing. Arriving aircraft would enter at the top 
of the IAF holding pattern and drop down in 1,000-foot increments as the altitude below becomes clear, 
until they reach the initial approach altitude. At that time, the aircraft would self-separate along the 
approach path for landing. The profile view in figure 2 shows one of these arrival fixes and helps 
illustrate the holding pattern above the IAF. Note also that the shape of the SCA is similar to a Class C 
airspace design, but offset on the approach-side of the airport. Additionally, the shape of the SCA may 
also be tailored to fit the geometry of local airspace constraints. The outrigger IAFs on the opposite T 
could be used as the departure fixes. 
Figure 1. Plan view example of a Self-Controlled Area. 
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Figure 2. Profile view example of a Self-Controlled Area. 
As noted previously, the AMM would consist of a ground-based automation system, typically located 
at the airport. The AMM would not be an automation of the ATC function but would be more of a simple 
counter that issues sequence information based on a set of predetermined rules. The AMM would rely on 
aircraft position information provided through a ground-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) receiver to manage the operations within the SCA. Aircraft would be expected to 
contact the AMM via data link (Airport-Pilot Data Link Communications, APCLC) and request landing 
sequence information. The AMM would then provide either a notification of which airplane the pilot 
would follow (if there was an airplane in the sequence ahead of the pilot) or inform the pilot that he 
cannot initiate the operation (e.g., enter the SCA) and provide him with a notification of the delay to 
expect before the operation can begin. What is unique to this concept is that ATC has implicit control of 
the arrival sequencing. This implicit control occurs because the AMM only accepts vertical entries into 
the SCA from aircraft flying immediately above the SCA (i.e., at the lowest IFR altitude above the SCA 
vertical boundary). This design could provide ATC with a relatively low workload and seamless means 
for controlling IFR entries into the SCA. In this concept, ATC directs aircraft to the appropriate IAF; the 
AMM provides the aircraft with an approach sequence; and the pilot follows the sequence for the 
approach and landing. 
In addition to its other calculations, the AMM must also assure that there would be available missed 
approach airspace for each aircraft arriving in the SCA. Since it must be assumed that every approach 
may result in a missed approach and since there would not be an active controller involved in SCA 
operations (who could respond in real time with unique missed approach instructions), each aircraft 
entering the SCA would be given specific missed approach information by the AMM as it enters the 
airspace. This technique would keep the ground-based automation relatively simple and less critical to 
the operational concept. However, it would mean that the total number of operations would be 
constrained by the number of unique missed approach locations that could exist within the SCA. For the 
SCA shown in figures 1 and 2, there are four missed approach holding options (two holding altitudes at 
each MAHF), therefore there are a total of four approach operations allowed at one time in this version of 
a SCA. Again, it is expected that this design would be modified for specific airport and airspace 
configurations. Also note, however, that designs with significantly more missed approach fixes may not 
significantly increase the number of allowable landing operations. 
For the generic SCA shown in figures 1 and 2, there are four missed approach positions, two at 
ANNIE and two at CATHY. Therefore, there would be a total of four approach operations allowed at one 
time in the generic SCA. From this maximum of four operations, exclusive of departure operations, a set 
of implementation and operating rules were developed. The normal SCA operating rules are as follows: 
- No more than four concurrent arrival operations are allowed in the SCA. 
- Simultaneous entries are not allowed at a single IAF. 
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- Entry is granted only if no other aircraft on approach is assigned to that fix as their MAHF. 
- Entries may not result in the assignment of more than two aircraft to a specific fix, with the 
assignment as either an IAF or as a MAHF.  
- Vertical entries (descending into the SCA while in the arrival holding pattern) are only allowed at the 
IAFs from the lowest IFR altitude above the SCA. 
- Upon entering the SCA at an IAF, aircraft are to go to the lowest available altitude and then continue 
to descend as altitudes below them become available. 
- Alternating MAHFs are given to sequential aircraft (e.g., the first aircraft is given ANNIE, the second 
aircraft is given CATHY, the third aircraft is given ANNIE, etc.). Note that for operational efficiency 
reasons, if there were no other landing aircraft (i.e., aircraft with approach sequences) in the SCA, the 
first arriving aircraft would be assigned a "same-side" MAHF (e.g., if the arrival fix is ANNIE, the 
MAHF will be ANNIE). An example approach chart with ANNIE as the MAHF is given in figure 3. 
- When proceeding to a holding fix on a missed approach, aircraft are to climb to the lowest available 
altitude (e.g., the first aircraft heading to ANNIE climbs to 2000 feet, the next aircraft going to 
ANNIE climbs to 3000 feet). 
- Aircraft operating in the SCA must be able to climb at 300 feet per mile (required for obtaining the 
required vertical separation at a MAHF if the lower altitude is occupied). 
It is also noteworthy that airports would only need to make relatively minimal infrastructure 
investments to increase their ability to sustain operations during periods of IMC. Airports would be 
expected to have weather reporting capability (e.g., Automated Weather Observing System - AWOS) and 
would need to install an AMM, a ground-based ADS-B receiver, and have a data link capability. AWOS 
input into the AMM may also be needed to assist the AMM to determine the appropriate instrument 
procedure (i.e., the appropriate landing direction). 
For this operational concept to be viable, a link between the AMM and ATC would be required. This 
link would be necessary to enable ATC to terminate and subsequently re-enable HVO operations when 
necessary to accommodate non-HVO operations (e.g., normal IFR operations). This link would also be 
necessary to efficiently enable HVO departure operations that would transition into traditional IFR 
airspace. Additionally, if controllers had access to the SCA status information, this could facilitate air 
traffic management. For example, if controllers knew that the SCA was not currently accepting aircraft 
(because the SCA was full), and that there would be a 20-minute delay at the airport, they could begin 
planning for that delay in advance. This information could then be provided to arriving aircraft by ATC 
or possibly broadcast on ATIS-like transmission. 
Since the SATS project is focused on achieving a realistic, operationally deployable system for the 
2010 timeframe, this concept emphasized integration with the current and the planned near-term National 
Airspace System (NAS). As a result, the design approach focused on simplicity from both a procedural 
and systems requirements standpoint. It was further assumed that any additional ATC workload must be 
minimized and that enroute procedures would be as similar to today’s system as possible. This concept is 
based on a distributed decision-making environment that would provide pilots with the necessary 
procedures, airborne systems, traffic awareness, and aircraft sequence information to enable safe 
operations within the SCA while minimizing the requirements for ground support tools. Because this is a 
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distributed decision-making environment, much of the decision-making responsibility would be left with 
the pilot, as it is today with visual flight rules (VFR) operations into non-towered airports. Finally, the 
overall philosophy in the development of the HVO operational procedures was to emphasize simplicity 
and operational safety as major aspects in the design. The details of these procedures for normal 
operations are provided in ref. 1. 
Figure 3. Example approach chart. 
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and hold. 
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 CATHY
MELFA/ACCOMACK COUNTY (MFV) 
124o
304o
124o
304o
15
00
03
4o
(5)
2000304o(5)
2000124o(5)
Rwy ldg 4999
TDZE      47
Apt Elev 47
APP CRS
034 0
AWOS-3
118.175
NORFOLK APP CON
126.05
JAGNO
CATHY
JAGNO   
(MAF and 
Threshold)
MELFA   
(FAF)
(IAF) 
CATHY   
(IAF) 
ANNIE  
(IF) 
UCGEL   
SATS RNAV (GPS) RWY 3 CATHY
MELFA/ACCOMACK COUNTY (MFV) 
MELFA, VIRGINIA
MELFA, VIRGINIA
SATS Equipped Only
GPS or RNP-0.3 required
DME/DME RNP .3 NA 
MELFA
UCGEL
2000
1500
0340
3.000
TCH 40
CATEGORY
LNAV MDA
CIRCLING NA
440-1  393 (400-1) 440-1 1/4  393 (400-1 1/4)
A B C D
5 NM 4.5 NM 0340 TO
RWY
 3
TDZE
47
50
04
 
X 
10
0
REIL Rwys 3 and 21 L
MIRL Rwy 3-21 L
ELEV 47
127 +
143
.
.
. 136
 +
SATS Self 
Controlled 
Area 264.
515
.
349
.
331
 +
.
374
.
3000
2000
Research Only – Not for Navigation
UNICOM
122.8 (CTAF) L
  
6
2.2 Conflict Detection and Alerting 
As noted in the development of the normal operational procedures for the SCA, an explicit design 
decision was made in that neither conflict detection and alerting (CD&A) nor conflict detection and 
resolution (CD&R) would be required as a primary means for aircraft separation in conducting HVO. 
That is, the HVO procedures, with the supporting AMM design and relatively simple flight displays, 
would provide the primary means for aircraft-to-aircraft separation within the SCA. It was assumed, 
however, that either CD&A or CD&R would be required as a secondary means for operational safety. 
Given this, the inherent nature of off-nominal situations will probably require an onboard conflict 
detection system to obtain an operationally viable level of safety. 
2.3 Prototype Aircraft Multi-Function Display 
The underlying functionality and display formats of a modern multi-function display (MFD), 
representative of a current-generation GPS moving map display, were assumed as the implementation 
basis for the SATS HVO concept. A basic map-page layout for this generic MFD is shown in figure 4. 
Major functions and display items assumed for the map portion of the MFD are: 
- A track-up, moving map display that includes both geographic and navigation information. 
- Aircraft-centered and aircraft-offset formats. 
- Adjustable map range scales. 
- Programmable bezel buttons. 
- Feature-select knobs. 
 
Figure 4. Generic MFD map layout. 
 
Feature select knob, 
function specific 
 
Feature select knob, 
primary functions 
AMM-procedure 
display window 
 
Pilot Advisor window 
 
Programmable bezel 
buttons 
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In addition to the navigation map information, the MFD would provide traffic information (ref. 6), 
HVO-specific alerting information, and Airport-Pilot Data Link Communications (APDLC) messages. 
APDLC messages could provide AMM messages as well as general airport information, such as Digital 
Automatic Terminal Information Service (D-ATIS). Note that APDLC is a two-way, addressed data link 
that would function in a manner similar to a CPDLC system (ref. 7).  
The MFD would also include a pilot procedure tool, unique to the HVO concept. This tool, called the 
Pilot-Advisor (PA), would provide an automated HVO-specific checklist to the pilot relative to the 
current state of the aircraft and other surrounding traffic. Effectively, the PA, would provide prompts in 
the PA window to the pilot regarding the next appropriate procedural step for the current HVO 
procedure. The PA window would only display one message at a time, with that message being the oldest 
message with the highest priority.  Table 1 lists the proposed messages, with priority level 1 as a higher 
priority than priority level 0.  For example, the “Monitor Path” (blue, priority level 1) takes precedence 
and would overwrite the “OPEN: 2000” message (black, priority 0).  The message text color would be 
consistent with alerting standards (ref. 8). The prototype messages for the PA information, displayed in 
the PA window on the MFD, are provided in Table 1. Unlike the SATS HVO requirement for CD&A or 
CD&R, the HVO concept does not require the use of a PA, although preliminary tests with subject pilots 
have found it to be highly desirable. 
Alerting information, provided in an alert window on the MFD map, along with any appropriate audio 
cues, would also be provided via the MFD. Alerting information would include the following: 
- The availability of any new broadcast message: e.g., AWOS, D-ATIS, or AMM broadcast data. 
- The reception of any new AMM instruction addressed to the aircraft, e.g., entry notification. 
- A new PA message. 
- Traffic conflict messages. 
This MFD implementation, along with the PA tool, is but one possible means for providing an airborne 
capability to support the HVO concept. 
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Table 1. Pilot-Advisor (PA) Messages 
 
Message definition Example 
message 
Priority 
level 
The pilot is entering the SCA without an entry notification 
 1 
The pilot is entering the SCA at the wrong IAF. 
 1 
“Open altitude” informs the pilot of the next altitude that is required for the current 
procedure and indicate that no other HVO aircraft is occupying that altitude. This 
message example informs the pilot that the 3000 ft altitude slot is open (available).  
 0 
The pilot has climbed or descended beyond the open (available) altitude. This 
message would be displayed on the second line of the PA window as a modifier to 
the instruction displayed on the first line. 
 1 
If an operation is pending but has not occurred after a predetermined time due to an 
unexpected delay by the pilot, a "proceed now" prompt will be added to the PA 
message. This message will also be associated with an alert. 
 1 
Time-To-Approach (TTA) defines when the aircraft may leave the IAF with the 
appropriate spacing behind the aircraft it will be following. The example is 1 minute, 
32 seconds before approach initiation. 
 0 
This message shows the pilot that the approach may be initiated. 
 0 
This message shows that the separation distance from the pilot’s aircraft to the 
preceding approach aircraft is below the nominal value (for either an approach or a 
departure) and that the pilot should reduce speed. 
 1 
The pilot is flying faster than the nominal approach speed. 
 1 
The pilot is flying slower than the nominal approach speed. This message is 
inhibited if a "too close" message has been issued. 
 1 
The pilot is flying off of the approach path. 
 1 
The pilot is the second aircraft conducting a missed approach to a common MAHF, 
and he is overtaking the preceding missed approach aircraft. An expedited climb to 
3000 ft is required in this example; this information would be shown on the second 
line of the message window. 
 1 
The pilot is going to the wrong MAHF. 
 1 
This message shows that a departure may be initiated. It is displayed when the pilot 
is ready for takeoff and there is sufficient separation between both arriving and 
departing HVO aircraft for an HVO departure operation to be performed. 
 0 
The pilot is flying the wrong departure procedure. 
 1 
 
 
NO SEQUENCE
EXIT SCA
WRONG IAF
OPEN: 3000
OPEN: 3000
MONITOR ALT
TTA: 1:32
OPEN: 2000
PROCEED NOW
OPEN: APPR
TOO FAST
CHECK SPEED
TOO SLOW
CHECK SPEED
OPEN: 3000
CLIMB NOW
WRONG MAHF
OPEN: DEPART
WRONG DP
MONITOR PATH
TOO CLOSE
REDUCE SPD
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3.0 Off-Nominal Operations 
The development of off-nominal operations created a set of procedures somewhat similar to today’s 
procedures. It was recognized that procedures cannot be written for every possible scenario, and that 
voice communication will sometimes be essential in safely concluding an off-nominal operation. 
Development of these proposed off-nominal operations still require a safety fault tree analysis and 
experiments to validate them. This papers offers one possible implementation, i.e., using a Multi-
Function Display and a Pilot Advisor. However, other implementation schemes are possible, and the Pilot 
Advisor functionality is not a requirement of HVO. 
3.1 Off-Nominal Categories 
The off-nominal conditions that were identified for inclusion into the HVO procedures were classified 
into four categories: routine off-nominal operations, procedural deviations, equipment malfunctions, and 
aircraft emergency procedures. 
The routine off-nominal conditions that were identified included: 
- A pilot cancellation of an approach request. 
- A change of landing approach direction. 
- A pilot cancellation of a departure request. 
- Leading aircraft conducting a circle-to-land operation. 
The procedural deviations that were identified included: 
- An aircraft returning to an incorrect MAHF. 
- A loss of aircraft-to-aircraft spacing on approach. 
- The inability to use an assigned IAF or MAHF. 
The equipment malfunctions that were identified included: 
- The loss of aircraft state data output on an arriving SATS aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data output on a departing SATS aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data input on an arriving SATS aircraft. 
- The loss of aircraft state data input on a departing SATS aircraft. 
- The loss of the AMM. 
- The loss of AMM reception by a single aircraft. 
- The loss of voice radio communication capability. 
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The emergency conditions that were identified included the following: 
- A priority-landing request from an aircraft with an approach sequence. 
- A priority-landing request from a departing aircraft. 
Examples of each of these two emergency conditions are shown in figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 is an 
example of a priority-landing request from an aircraft holding for an approach at ANNIE at 3000 ft. In 
this figure, the aircraft at the highest altitude has made a priority request and will follow the aircraft on 
final approach, landing ahead of the aircraft holding at the lower altitudes. Figure 6 is an example of a 
priority-landing request from a departing aircraft. This condition would occur if an aircraft conducting an 
HVO departure needed an unplanned, immediate return to the airport. In this figure, the departing aircraft 
(the right-most aircraft) has made the landing request and will land before the two aircraft on the farther 
holding patterns. 
The procedures that were developed to support these identified conditions are provided in the 
subsequent sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of a priority-landing request. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Example of priority landing request from a departing aircraft. 
 
3.2 Implementation Considerations 
The addition of off-nominal operations in this document, and the development of their operational 
procedures have, not surprisingly, led to some increase in the overall complexity of the concept required 
to support these operations. However, as in the development of the normal operational procedures, these 
Aircraft requesting 
priority 
Aircraft requesting 
priority 
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new procedures were based, whenever possible, on similar existing procedures for VFR operations or 
non-radar, IFR operations. Also, with regard to VFR operations, it is worthwhile to reiterate that the 
normal operational procedures (ref. 1) allow for mixed operations of both SATS and VFR aircraft, where 
these operations are expected to be accommodated in a manner similar to today’s mix of IFR and VFR 
aircraft, i.e., the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic (ref. 9). 
Also as noted previously, off-nominal operations, especially the detection of equipment failures, will 
require system-to-system periodic checks and some data retention outside of the AMM. As such, the 
following requirements were identified to support the off-nominal procedures. 
- Changes to the SCA state data information (performed in two phases) 
1. System-to-system (e.g., AMM to the aircraft via the APDLC) information exchange would 
require confirmation from the receiver back to the sender. 
2. A confirmation process within the aircraft would be required between the aircraft systems and 
pilot (e.g., the pilot alerted to a change responds with activation of a confirmation/accept button 
on the MFD). 
- Periodic AMM status messages to all participating HVO aircraft. 
- Periodic ADS-B reception messages from the AMM to participating HVO aircraft (after the AMM 
has received an ADS-B message from the aircraft, it would periodically reply with a message back to 
the aircraft noting that the aircraft’s ADS-B message has been received). This message is necessary to 
alert aircraft to a loss of their ADS-B output or APDLC input capabilities, and is also required prior to 
conducting a departure operation. 
- Prior to takeoff, departing HVO aircraft would require the reception of both an AMM normal-
operation status message and an ADS-B reception message from the AMM. 
- Current SCA status information (e.g., the number of operations and aircraft identification) would be 
sent from the AMM. 
- Each participating aircraft would retain sequence data from the AMM on all surrounding SCA traffic. 
This information would be used by the pilots in situations when a reversion to pilot-to-pilot 
procedural separation is required due to the loss of aircraft state data information. These situations 
would be analogous to ATC situations upon the loss of ATC radar information. 
- Periodic AMM normal-operation status messages would be sent to ATC (e.g., the number of 
operations and aircraft identification). 
It is also important to note that while ADS-B would be the primary means for the dissemination of 
aircraft state data, the APDLC could be used to provide a secondary means for data exchange. Therefore, 
failures such as the loss of state data transmission are procedurally addressed only if all means of 
transmission have failed. 
This document only covers procedures unique to SATS HVO.  Pilots are expected to use traditional 
procedures in managing situations that are not unique to HVO.  Furthermore, today’s requirement for the 
use of voice communication and airmanship in handling emergencies will still be required in HVO. 
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Also note that any situation that would require closing the airport, e.g., a single-runway airport with 
the runway closed due to an accident, would require all approach aircraft to conduct a procedure similar 
to Initiating a Departure from a Missed Approach, described in reference 1. 
 
3.3 Routine Off-Nominal Procedures 
3.3.1 Pilot Cancellation of an Approach Request 
It is envisioned that this procedure would be used when weather conditions within the SCA would be 
marginal VFR with the instrument approach operation transitioning to a visual approach. For a pilot to 
cancel an HVO approach, VFR conditions to the airport must exist (although the aircraft may remain on 
an IFR flight plan). 
Canceling aircraft: 
1. The pilot would select the “cancel approach” feature on the MFD. 
2. The MFD would send the cancellation request to the AMM. 
3. The AMM would mark the aircraft as a non-participating aircraft (e.g., it is assumed that the 
aircraft has transitioned to VFR). 
4. The AMM would send the cancellation notice to the canceling aircraft. 
5. The MFD would notify the pilot that his cancellation request was received by the AMM. 
6. If the canceling aircraft has not received an approach sequence (i.e., it was outside the SCA with 
a standby notification), the AMM would delete the aircraft from its request queue. 
7. If the aircraft had received an approach sequence: 
- The canceling pilot would announce the cancellation over the Common Traffic Advisory 
Frequency (CTAF). 
- The AMM would remove the canceling aircraft from the approach sequence. 
- The AMM would re-sequence the aircraft that followed the aircraft canceling HVO. 
- The AMM would send the new sequence information to all HVO aircraft. 
Other HVO aircraft: 
1. The MFD would identify the canceling aircraft as a non-participating aircraft. 
2. If the aircraft had an approach sequence that has been changed (i.e., re-sequenced by the AMM), 
the MFD would notify the SATS pilot to the changes in the approach information (e.g., new 
leading aircraft and/or MAHF). 
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3. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., OPEN 3000, OPEN 
APPROACH) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledged the re-sequence. This 
acknowledgement could occur via a button-press on the MFD. 
Note that for this and all other procedures that require an information exchange (e.g., cancellation 
request or re-sequence data) between the pilot and the onboard system, an acknowledgement by the pilot 
would be required. As noted previously, this acknowledgement could occur via a button-press on the 
MFD. Similarly, an information exchange between the onboard system and the AMM would also require 
an underlying (system-to-system) data exchange confirmation (e.g., an acknowledgement). This 
acknowledgement could occur via a data link “handshake” between the two systems. 
3.3.2 Change of Approach Direction 
The determination of the active runway should probably be a function of ATC, which may require 
ATC support tools, better than a D-ATIS or AWOS, in supporting this determination. Additionally, pilots 
should be able to provide feedback and input into the decision regarding the selection of the approach 
direction and the active runway. Further research may be required to agree upon an appropriate means for 
providing this determination.   
It should be noted that normal changes of runway landing direction should be managed prior to aircraft 
being assigned approach sequences. That is, ATC should inhibit arrivals until all ongoing SCA 
operations have been completed, holding the new arrivals above the SCA until all current SCA operations 
have been completed. Also note that the SCA approach direction may not need to change if circle-to-land 
operations are used. Assuming that a change to the instrument approach direction must take place while 
aircraft are conducting SCA operations, the following should occur: 
1. The AMM should inhibit all new SCA operations and set the SCA status to no new operations 
(NNO). 
2. The AMM should notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
3. The AMM would notify ATC regarding the configuration change and identify all active HVO 
aircraft. 
4. All landing aircraft should either land or conduct a missed approach operation. 
5. Missed approach aircraft should contact ATC to obtain a clearance to the MAHF at the lowest 
IFR altitude above the SCA. 
6. At the completion of all HVO approach operations, which would occur when all aircraft have 
either landed or are no longer actively conducting SATS operations, the AMM would reconfigure 
the SCA for the new landing direction. 
7. Once all of these actions have occurred, ATC may allow the AMM to resume SCA operations. 
3.3.3 Pilot Cancellation of a Departure Request 
If a pilot cancels an SCA departure request, the following should occur: 
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1. PA alerting would be inhibited for the canceling aircraft. 
2. All other aircraft would continue with their normal operations. 
3.3.4 Leading Aircraft Conducting a Circle-to-Land 
This situation would occur if the leading aircraft plans to conduct a circle-to-land operation. For this 
situation, the following procedure should be used: 
1. The pilot of the circle-to-land aircraft would select this function on the MFD. 
2. The MFD of the circle-to-land aircraft would send the circle-to-land information to include the 
intended landing runway to all HVO aircraft. 
3. Based on the received circle-to-land intent information, the following aircraft would have an 
additional distance or time interval added to the nominal spacing value for the approach spacing. 
Further development of this operation may be required. 
 
3.4 Procedural Deviations 
3.4.1 Aircraft Returning to an Incorrect Missed Approach Holding Fix 
This procedure addresses the problem of an HVO pilot attempting to fly an incorrect missed approach 
procedure for the instrument approach. Note that for a pilot to turn toward the wrong MAHF, the pilot 
would have already made the following errors: performed the incorrect missed approach procedure; 
ignored the MAHF identified in the MFD “to waypoint” data block; ignored the missed approach 
procedure depicted on the moving map display of the MFD (and any associated primary flight guidance 
information on the Primary Flight Display - PFD); and ignored the PA alert for an incorrect missed 
approach procedure. 
In the event that an aircraft does accidentally attempt to return to the wrong MAHF, the following 
procedure should be performed once the pilot recognizes the error (e.g., observes the correct MAHF 
name on the MFD): 
1. The pilot should make a call over CTAF announcing the problem. 
2. The pilot should contact ATC as soon as possible and announce the problem 
3. Due to the potential loss of separation with other aircraft on the instrument approach, this aircraft 
must not attempt to return to the assigned MAHF. The pilot should continue climbing along the 
errant missed approach path to an altitude above the SCA.  
4. The pilot should contact ATC and request an IFR clearance from ATC. If possible, this clearance 
should be obtained prior to departing the SCA. 
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3.4.2 Loss of Aircraft-To-Aircraft Spacing on Approach 
An aircraft that is predicted to lose aircraft-to-aircraft spacing while on the approach and subsequently 
receives a loss-of-separation alert should do the following: 
1. Begin an immediate climb to its missed approach altitude. 
2. Fly the lateral path of the approach and subsequent missed approach. 
3. Fly the planned approach speeds (to maintain conformance for other SCA aircraft), where these 
speeds are either standard speeds for the aircraft or pre-selected by the pilot. 
3.4.3 Unable to Use an Assigned IAF or MAHF 
This condition may occur because of severe weather at the IAF or MAHF.  
If this situation occurs while still in ATC managed airspace, the pilot should coordinate with ATC to 
proceed to the other IAF or divert to another airport.   
If within the SCA, the pilot should climb above the SCA in the safest possible manner, avoiding 
obstacles, other aircraft, and the severe weather. During the climb, the pilot should notify ATC of the 
situation, noting that contacting ATC is a priority since the aircraft could be entering controlled airspace 
without a clearance. 
 
3.5 Equipment Malfunction Procedures 
3.5.1 Loss of ADS-B Output on an Arriving SATS Aircraft 
This situation would occur if an HVO aircraft had lost the capability to transmit its state data 
information via ADS-B. If this situation exists, the following should occur: 
Aircraft Without an Arrival Sequence: 
Part of the arrival sequencing process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state data 
output from the requesting aircraft. If the aircraft has not already been issued an arrival sequence, the 
AMM would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B transmit capability (and all other output 
capabilities) prior to the sequence notification. If there is no ADS-B output, the aircraft would be notified 
of this condition and it would be denied an approach sequence. 
Aircraft With an Arrival Sequence and with APDLC Output: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently loses its ADS-B output but still has APDLC 
capability, the following should occur: 
1. The AMM, noting the loss of the ADS-B signal from an aircraft, would inhibit all new SCA 
operations and would set the SCA status message to no-new-operations (NNO). 
2. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
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3. The AMM, noting the loss of an ADS-B signal from an aircraft, would send that aircraft a “lost 
ADS-B output” message that could be displayed as an alert message on the MFD. The problem 
aircraft would then begin (or continue) transmitting its position data over the APDLC. This APDLC 
message would be broadcast to all aircraft in the SCA. 
4. The AMM would resume normal operations after the problem aircraft has landed and would also 
set the SCA status appropriately. 
Aircraft With an Arrival Sequence and without APDLC Output: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently loses both its ADS-B output and its APDLC 
capability, the following should occur: 
1. The AMM, noting the loss of an ADS-B signal from an aircraft (and all other output capability), 
would inhibit all new SCA operations and set the SCA status message to no-new-operations 
(NNO). 
2. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
3. The AMM would send all aircraft a “lost signal” message via the APDLC, identifying the aircraft 
that had lost its transmission capability. 
4. All aircraft that were conducting approach operations would revert to procedural separation using 
CTAF and continue the approach operations using their original sequence assignments. 
5. Departure operations would be inhibited until the aircraft with the problem lands. 
6. A notification to the AMM that the problem aircraft has landed or has departed the SCA would be 
accomplished via a ground-based message from ATC. 
3.5.2 Loss of ADS-B or APDLC Output on a Departing SATS Aircraft 
Prior to conducting an SCA departure operation, aircraft would perform an ADS-B and APDLC check 
with the AMM. It is envisioned that if a successful link check could not be performed, the PA would 
inform the pilot that an HVO departure was not possible. In this instance, this departing aircraft would be 
required to revert to unequipped operations (ref. 1). 
3.5.3 Loss of ADS-B Input on an Arriving SATS Aircraft 
This situation would occur if an HVO aircraft had lost the capability to receive ADS-B information 
from other SCA aircraft. If this situation takes place, the following should occur: 
Aircraft Without an Arrival Sequence: 
Part of the arrival sequencing process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state data 
input to the requesting aircraft. If the aircraft has not already been issued an arrival sequence, the AMM 
would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B reception capability (and all other input capabilities) prior 
to the sequence notification. If there were no ADS-B inputs, the aircraft would be denied an approach 
sequence. 
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Aircraft With an Arrival Sequence but with APDLC Input: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently lost its ADS-B reception capability but still 
had APDLC capability, the following should occur. 
1. The aircraft with the equipment problem would notify the AMM of the loss of ADS-B reception. 
2. If all SCA aircraft were not already broadcasting their position data via APDLC, the AMM would 
request this transmission of state data via APDLC from all participating aircraft. 
3. The aircraft with the equipment problem would use the APDLC-received state data as necessary. 
Aircraft With an Arrival Sequence and without APDLC Input: 
If the aircraft has an approach sequence and subsequently loses its ADS-B input and its APDLC 
capability, the following should occur. 
1. The aircraft with the equipment failure would notify the AMM of the loss of ADS-B reception 
capability. Lack of a periodic status message via APDLC from an aircraft could also cause the 
AMM to initiate this event.  
2. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations and set the SCA status message to 
no-new-operations (NNO). 
3. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
4. The AMM would send all aircraft an “unable to receive” message via the APDLC, identifying the 
aircraft that had lost its reception capability. 
5. All aircraft conducting approach operations would revert to procedural separation using CTAF 
and continue the approach operations using their original sequencing assignments. 
6. The AMM would resume normal operations after the problem aircraft has landed and would set 
the SCA status appropriately. 
3.5.4 Loss of ADS-B or APDLC Input on a Departing SATS Aircraft 
Part of the departure process that the AMM performs is the confirmation of ADS-B state data input to 
the requesting aircraft. The AMM would attempt to confirm the aircraft’s ADS-B reception capability 
(and all other input capabilities). If this confirmation fails, this aircraft would be required to revert to 
unequipped operations. 
3.5.5 Loss of AMM Output 
The AMM would send a periodic operational status message to ATC and to all proximate aircraft via 
the APDLC. Loss of this operational status message would indicate a failure of the AMM. Upon loss of 
the AMM status signal, the following should occur: 
1. By default, the SCA would be inhibited from accepting any new arrival or departure operations. 
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2. ATC would be informed of an AMM failure though the loss of the periodic status message from 
the AMM. 
3. ATC should then restrict any new SCA entries and departures. 
4. The aircraft would identify the AMM failure through the loss of the AMM status message. 
5. The MFD would provide a notification to the pilot that the AMM has failed. 
6. Pilots with an assigned arrival sequence would use CTAF to corroborate their landing sequence. 
7. Each pilot would close his flight plan after landing, which is both a standard ATC normal 
procedure (ref. 9) and an HVO procedure. This would provide ATC a means for correlating the 
landing aircraft with the previously retained information that identified the current SCA traffic 
aircraft. 
8. At the completion of all HVO operations, the airport would revert to non-HVO operations. 
3.5.6 Loss of AMM Reception by a Single Aircraft 
As noted previously, the AMM would send a periodic operational status message to all proximate 
aircraft via the APDLC and to ATC. Loss of this operational status message could indicate an APDLC 
receiver failure on the SATS aircraft. Upon loss of the AMM status signal the following should occur: 
1. To confirm that the problem is single aircraft specific, the pilot of the aircraft without AMM 
reception would announce the loss of the AMM data via CTAF. If more than one aircraft has lost 
AMM reception, then the previous procedure (Loss of AMM Output) would be used. 
2. The pilots would use CTAF to corroborate their landing sequence. 
3. The aircraft would land in their original sequencing order. 
3.5.7 Loss of Voice Communications 
HVO procedures were developed for the situations when aircraft have lost their voice-radio 
communication capability. Following normal HVO procedures assures pilots of the ability to self separate 
within the SCA and land according to the AMM generated sequence. For aircraft in ATC airspace, 
traditional procedures (ref. 9) would be used in conjunction with the HVO arrival procedures.  
Arriving Aircraft Outside of the SCA: 
1. As noted previously, ATC would use traditional lost communication procedures. 
2. With the exception of the lost-communications aircraft, the AMM would inhibit all new 
operations and set the SCA status message to no-new-operations (NNO). 
3. The lost-communications aircraft would be provided with a normal, non-priority approach 
sequence via APDLC, assuming that all other entry constraints were met (Sec. 2.1). 
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4. The lost-communications aircraft should descend to the altitude immediately above the SCA at a 
time appropriate for traditional lost-communications procedures. 
5. ATC would enable the AMM for new HVO operations after the lost communications aircraft has 
landed. 
6. The AMM would then resume normal operations. 
Arriving Aircraft Inside of the SCA: 
If the aircraft had an approach sequence and subsequently lost its voice communications capability, 
normal operations would be continued. Voice-communication loss should not be a critical issue since the 
communication radio is only used as a secondary means for situation awareness and for redundancy in 
other off-nominal procedures. The communication radio should be required to initiate a SATS operation, 
i.e., it is part of the minimum equipment requirement. A loss of voice communications does mean a loss 
of the CTAF environment, so transitions to VFR follow existing procedures (ref. 8). 
Departing Aircraft: 
 Aircraft that have lost their voice communication capability and are not airborne may not conduct an 
HVO departure. Airborne aircraft would use traditional IFR lost-communication procedures (ref. 9). 
 
3.6 Emergency Procedures 
3.6.1 Priority Landing Request from an Aircraft with an Approach Sequence 
This procedure would typically be used for an aircraft that is experiencing an emergency situation and 
must land immediately. This capability is valid only for aircraft that have an approach sequence assigned 
or are in a position where they would be eligible for an SCA entry notification (e.g., at the lowest 
available altitude over an SCA IAF). If they are not eligible for an SCA entry, they must coordinate with 
ATC since they are still under ATC control. Pilots within the SCA that have an emergency that precludes 
them from flying the complete instrument approach (engine or icing problems requiring an immediate 
landing) can still use the procedures in this section. Although terrain clearance cannot be assured in IMC 
when deviating from a certified approach (e.g., the pilot must proceed direct present position to the 
airport due to the emergency), the procedures below ensure all other pilots in the vicinity have awareness 
of the emergency and that the emergency aircraft has landing priority. 
Requesting Aircraft: 
For the aircraft requesting landing priority, the following procedure should be used: 
1. The pilot would announce the emergency and his intent over CTAF. 
2. The pilot would select the “emergency landing” feature on the MFD. 
3. The MFD would send the priority request to the AMM. 
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4. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations and set the SCA status to NNO.  
5. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
6. The AMM would send the identity of the priority aircraft to all HVO aircraft. 
7. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) on the requesting aircraft. 
8. As soon as possible, the priority aircraft would begin the approach, procedurally spacing with 
respect to prior approach aircraft. If the approach spacing interval becomes too close, the pilot of 
the priority aircraft has the responsibility to request the preceding aircraft to perform a missed 
approach. Note that the requesting aircraft will not be assigned an approach sequence. If the 
aircraft was initially at the higher altitude at the IAF than the approach altitude, this aircraft 
would only begin a normal descent (e.g., 500 foot-per-minute descent rate) after crossing the IAF 
inbound on the approach. 
Other SCA Aircraft: 
1. The aircraft symbol on the MFD for the priority aircraft would be highlighted. 
2. Arriving aircraft that are already on the approach would continue with the approach procedure. If 
the emergency aircraft requests that the approach path needs to be immediately cleared for the 
emergency operation, these aircraft could execute an early missed-approach climb. 
3. If the priority aircraft was already on the approach or was the first aircraft in holding at an IAF 
(e.g., the next aircraft to initiate the approach), the AMM would not re-sequence the other 
aircraft. Otherwise, the AMM would re-sequence the aircraft waiting for an approach in their 
original order, excluding the priority aircraft.  
4. The AMM would send the new sequence information to all HVO aircraft. 
5. The MFD would notify the appropriate pilots of their re-sequence assignments. 
6. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledged the re-sequence. 
7. The MFD would inhibit all approach-operations PA messages (e.g., open approach) until the 
priority aircraft has crossed the runway threshold. 
8. Once the priority aircraft has crossed the runway threshold, normal operations would be resumed. 
An example of this procedure is shown in figure 5. 
3.6.2 Priority Landing Request from a Departing Aircraft 
This procedure was designed to support a departing aircraft that is unable to continue the departure 
operation and must return for an instrument approach to the airport. 
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Requesting Aircraft: 
Note that the first 7 steps of this procedure are the same as for Priority Landing Request from an 
Aircraft with an Approach Sequence. 
1. The pilot would announce the emergency and his intent over CTAF. 
2. The pilot would select the “emergency landing” feature on the MFD. 
3. The MFD would send the priority request via APDLC to the AMM. 
4. The AMM would inhibit all new SCA operations and would set the SCA status to 
no-new-operations (NNO). 
5. The AMM would notify ATC that the SCA is in an inhibit status. 
6. The AMM would send the identity of the priority aircraft to all HVO aircraft. 
7. The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach). 
8. As soon as possible, the priority aircraft would proceed to either IAF, at the lowest altitude, and 
begin the approach, procedurally spacing with respect to prior approach aircraft (if any). Note that 
this aircraft would not be assigned an approach sequence. If the approach spacing interval 
becomes too close, the pilot of the priority aircraft has the responsibility to request the proceeding 
aircraft to perform a missed approach.  
Other SCA Aircraft: 
1. The aircraft symbol on the MFD for the priority aircraft would be highlighted. 
2. Arriving aircraft that are already on the approach would continue with the approach procedure. If 
the emergency aircraft needs the approach path immediately cleared, the pilot of the emergency 
aircraft would request that the preceding aircraft execute an early missed-approach. 
3. Arrival aircraft that are holding at the IAF (i.e., not already on the approach) and are at the lowest 
altitude would be re-sequenced, if necessary, such that they would leave the IAF for the approach 
as soon as possible (i.e., the intent is to make a clear approach path for the emergency aircraft). 
These aircraft should make every attempt to expedite their approach operations. 
4. For arrival aircraft that are holding at the IAF (i.e., not already on the approach) and are not at the 
lowest altitude, the following should occur: 
- These aircraft would be re-sequenced, as required, for the approach. 
- If the aircraft has an approach sequence that has been changed (i.e., re-sequenced), the MFD 
would notify the SATS pilot to the changes in the approach information (e.g., new leading 
aircraft or MAHF). 
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- These aircraft would be given a STANDBY notification by the AMM.  
- The MFD would notify the appropriate pilots of their standby assignment.  
- The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the pilot of the re-sequenced aircraft acknowledges the re-sequence. 
- The MFD would inhibit all continuing-operations PA messages (e.g., open altitude, open 
approach) until the emergency aircraft lands. 
5. Normal operations would be resumed once the priority aircraft has landed. 
An example of this procedure is shown in figures 7-10, with the chosen example portraying the worst 
approach sequencing situation prior to start of this procedure. The start of this procedure is shown in 
figure 7, with an aircraft on the approach and three other aircraft waiting to begin the approach. The 
approach sequence numbers are shown in this figure for these aircraft.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 portrays the situation immediately after the departing aircraft makes the priority request. At 
this point, the AMM would have re-sequenced and issued the new sequence numbers and, where 
appropriate, STANDBY notifications. Note that the action by the AMM has affected all of the holding 
aircraft.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: after re-sequence. 
Figure 7. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: initial situation. 
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Figure 9 shows the situation as the second aircraft begins its approach. Note that the standard HVO 
airborne tools, using the AMM sequencing information, have provided the information to the second 
aircraft that it is safe to initiate its approach. Also note that the first aircraft has landed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: aircraft #2 begins approach. 
Figure 10 shows the situation after the third aircraft begins its approach, again using its onboard tools 
to determine when to begin the approach. Figure 11 is a plan-view graphic of the situation shown in 
figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: aircraft #3 begins approach. 
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Figure 11. Plan-view of the situation of figure 10. 
 
Figure 12 shows the situation as the priority aircraft begins its approach. Note that while the standard 
HVO airborne tools have provided the information to the third aircraft to initiate its approach, the pilot of 
the priority aircraft, because of the emergency situation, will initiate the approach as soon as possible. 
Also note that if the approach spacing interval becomes too close, the pilot of the priority aircraft has the 
responsibility to request the proceeding aircraft to perform a missed approach. 
 
Figure 12. Example of a priority landing request from a departing aircraft: priority aircraft begins approach. 
Once the priority aircraft has landed, the STANDBY aircraft will be allowed to resume approach 
operations. Also note that all normal operations would be resumed once the priority aircraft has landed. 
 
4.0 Summary 
The ability to operate multiple small aircraft, in near all weather conditions, at virtually any small 
airport offers a unique opportunity for revolutionary transportation growth and passenger convenience. A 
previous paper (ref. 1) presented a concept for aircraft operating at airports where operations are currently 
restricted to the inefficiency of a “one-in/one-out” procedure. This new concept would allow for 
simultaneous operations by multiple aircraft in this non-radar “terminal” airspace around small non-
towered airports. Aircraft operating in this airspace would need special avionics to participate that would 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aircraft 
requesting priority 
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probably include near-term technologies, such as ADS-B and a communications data link, and 
appropriate self-separation tools. This concept would also require a new, relatively simple ground-based 
automation system, typically located at the airport, that would provide appropriate sequencing 
information to the arriving aircraft.  
The effort described in this paper expands the SATS HVO operational concept to include off-nominal 
situations that could be expected to occur in a future SATS environment. The situations that were 
examined were segregated into four categories: routine, such as a change of landing approach direction; 
procedural deviations, such as flying to the wrong MAHF; equipment malfunctions, such as a loss of an 
aircraft’s communication system; and emergency situations, such as a priority request for an emergency 
landing. SATS operational procedures were developed to accommodate these off-nominal situations and 
were described in this paper. Potential pilot and ATC workload issues were also considered in the 
development of these new procedures. With respect to potential problems relating to pilot workload, 
airborne display concepts were also defined to assist the pilot during these off-nominal situations. An 
effort was also made to minimize the impact on ATC following an off-nominal event in the SCA. 
Additionally, since both equipment requirements and equipment malfunctions are closely interrelated in 
off nominal situations, a candidate implementation scheme was also presented. 
In keeping with the SATS goal of achieving a realistic, operationally deployable system for the 2010 
timeframe, the development of these new operational procedures to support off-nominal situations again 
emphasized simplicity in the design. The development focus was on providing an operational concept 
that was safe, would enable more than one operation at a time, and would not require significant ground 
infrastructure costs or improvements. A significant design effort was also expended to minimize 
equipment requirements and changes to today’s operating rules. The operational concepts and procedures 
described in this paper were intended to be a starting point for additional designs and analyses. 
Operational concepts such as the one proposed in the fundamental SATS HVO concept documents and 
expanded here could enhance the opportunity for point-to-point air taxi or charter operations into smaller 
airports, providing greater convenience to the traveling public. 
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